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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(h) provides the Utah Court 
of Appeals Jurisdiction of this appeajj. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the lower court erred in refusing to 
enter a judgment on plaintiff's civil rights claimf effec-
tively dismissing plaintiffs' civil rights claim. 
2. Whether the lower court erred in failing to 
try plaintiffs' civil right claim. 
3. Whether the lower court erred in refusing to 
award plaintiffs' attorney fees. 
4. Whether the lower court erred in refusing to 
award plaintiffs the costs paid by plaintiffs to a court-
appointed master. 
5. Whether the lower court erred in failing to 
award plaintiffs the costs incurred in auditing the defen-
dant 's records. 
6. Whether the lower court erred in failing to 
join other subdividers as party plaintiffs. 
1 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
S 1983. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State of 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, 
any Act of Congress applicable, exclusively to the District 
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia. 
§ 1988. Proceedings in Vindication of Civil Rights 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters 
conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this 
Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," 
for the protection of all persons in the United States in 
their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be 
exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the 
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the 
2 
same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted 
to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary 
to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, 
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution 
and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdic-
tion of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the 
same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said 
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it 
is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on 
the party found guilty. In any action or proceeding to 
enforce a provision of sections 197*^ , 1978, 1979, 1980 and 
1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 USCS §§ 1981-1983, 1985, 
1986], title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 USCS §§ 1691 et 
seq.], or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf 
of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a 
violation of, a provision of the United States Internal 
Revenue Code [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 [42 USCS §§ 2000det seq.], the court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the 
costs. 
3 
Amendment 14: Section 1* Citizens of the United States. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final "Ruling and Order of 
Judgment" denying plaintiffs' motion for the entry of 
judgment on their civil rights claim and denying plaintiffs 
an attorney's fee award. The lower court also denied 
plaintiffs' motions to join other subdividers as party 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' request for costs incurred by the 
plaintiffs in paying a court-appointed master and a CPA to 
audit West Jordan's records. 
A statement of the facts helpful and relevant to 
the issues presented for review are as follows: 
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1. Subdividers John Call and Clark Jenkins 
(hereafter "Call and Jenkins") sued the respondent City of 
West Jordan ("City") challenging the City's ordinance 
requiring subdividers to dedicate seven percent of the 
proposed subdivision land to the city or to pay the 
equivalent of the land value in cash. The land or cash was 
to be used by the city for flood control and/or park and 
recreational facilities. (R.2-11, 118-121.) 
2. The Third Judicial District Court upheld the 
ordinance and the subdividers apnealed. (R. 14 2,14 3,144, 
151,153.) 
3. The Utah Supreme Court, Call v. West Jordan, 
606 P.2d 217, (Utah 1979) (hereinafter Call I) affirmed and 
remanded (R.162-173.) (Copy of case attached as Addendum 1.) 
4. On rehearing, the Utah Supreme Court, Call v. 
West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980) (hereinafter Call II) 
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance on its face, 
but remanded the case to give the subdividers an opportunity 
to present evidence that the payment required of them did not 
have any reasonable relationship to the City's needs for 
flood control or parks and recreational facilities. (R. 401-
06, 696-98./) (Copy of case attached as Addendum 2.) 
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5. Thereafter, the trial court allowed the 
subdividers to amend their complaint to include claims (1) 
that the ordinance was invalid because the city did not 
follow statutory notice and hearing requirements in enacting 
the ordinance; and (2) a civil rights claim alleging that the 
subdividers rights to due process were denied by the city's 
failure to provide the required notice and public hearing. 
(R.306, 307-19,323,329,339,343.) 
6. Thereafter, the City defended against the 
amended allegations by stating that it had complied with the 
notice and hearing requirements. (R.1850-55.) The City also 
alleged it was immune from the civil rights claim. (R.1916, 
1919.) 
7. On the third appeal, the Utah Supreme Court, 
Call v. West Jordan 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) (hereafter Call 
III) , upheld the lower court's allowance of the amended 
complaint. The Utah Supreme Court also ruled that the city 
failed to comply with the statutory notice and public 
hearing requirements. Because the City failed to hold a 
public hearing, with notice, the court held the ordinance was 
void ab initio. The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to 
the lower court to enter judgment consistent with the opinion 
(R.1843-45.) (Copy of case attached as Addendum 3.) 
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8. Subsequently, the lower court denied plain-
tiffs' (1) motion for entry of judgment on plaintiffs' civil 
rights claim; (2) claim for attorney fees; (3) motion to join 
other subdividers as party plaintiffs; and (4) motion for 
costs paid by the plaintiffs for a court-appointed master and 
an audit of West Jordan's records. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
West Jordan deprived Call and Jenkins of their 
procedural rights to due process by failing to provide notice 
and a public hearing prior to legislating the seven percent 
impact fee ordinance and prior to taking Call's and Jenkin's 
money. In Call III, the Utah Supreme Court held that West 
Jordan failed to provide notice and a public hearing. The 
lower court erred in failing to enter a judgment in favor of 
the subdividers on their civil rights claim. 
Entering a civil rights judgment in favor of Call 
and Jenkins was not prohibited by Call III. Rather, such a 
judgment would be totally consistent with Call Ill's opinion. 
Call III ruled that since West Jordan did not hold a public 
hearing, the seven percent impact fee ordinance was void ab 
initio and ,Call and Jenkins were entitled to a judgment. 
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Because Call and Jenkins are entitled to a § 1983 
civil rights judgment against West Jordan, this case should 
be remanded for consideration of attorney fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988. 
West Jordan violated Rule 11 when it continued to 
advocate that an August 27, 1974 master plan meeting was the 
public hearing required by Utah Code Ann. §10-9-25 and 
procedural due process. That assertion, made in numerous 
pleadings and documents, was not grounded in fact nor 
warranted in law. In Call III/ the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
One's imagination must be stretched 
beyond rational limits to accept the 
master plan hearing as satisfying the 
public hearing requirements. 
Call III at 183. 
Because West Jordan violated Rule 11, the case 
should be remanded to the lower court with directions to 
enter a judgment awarding plaintiffs a reasonable attorney's 
fee and plaintiffs' costs incurred in paying an accountant 
and court appointed master to examine West Jordan's books. 
call and Jenkins are entitled to have the master's 
fees taxes as costs because they are the prevailing party and 
because West Jordan's failure to answer simple interrogato-
ries necessitated the reference. 3A J. Moore & J. Lucas, 
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Moore's Federal Practice, para- 53.04[1] (2d ed. 1987). For 
similar reasons, plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment for 
the cost of their accountant's examination of West Jordan's 
slip shod records. Andrecikopoulo j v. Broadmoor Mgt. Co. , 
670 P-2d 435 (Colo. App. 1983). 
The lower court erred in failing to grant Call and 
Jenkins's motion to join, as party plaintiffs, other sub-
dividers who paid impact fees. In Call I, the Utah Supreme 
Court found that the monies and property paid by the 
subdividers was a trust fund. In Call III the same court 
held that the impact fee ordinance establishing the trust 
fund was void from the beginning. 
Once the trust failed, only the subdividers had 
ownership interests in the impact fee trust fund. Persons 
interested in a trust fund are indispensable parties. 
Hiltsey v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987). 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER 
A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE SUBDIVIDERS 
ON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM 
1. Factual and Procedural Background. 
After Call II, the trial court allowed Call and 
Jenkins to amend their complaint to include claims that: (1) 
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the city did not hold a public hearing prior to enacting the 
ordinance; and (2) plaintiffs' civil rights were violated by 
the City's failure to provide the required notice and 
hearing. (R.306,307-19,323,329,339,343.) 
Trial was held on September 1, 2, and November 18 
of 1982- At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence, the 
defendant prior to putting on its case in chief moved to 
dismiss plaintiffs' complaint- The court granted the 
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, no cause 
of action. (R.1216-1217, 1492-93.) Plaintiffs appealed. 
In Call III, the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally 
found that there was no notice and there was no hearing and 
remanded the case to enter judgment consistent with the 
court's opinion. Call III at 183-184. (See Addendum 3.) 
2. Legal Analysis. 
The applicable civil rights statute provides: 
Every person who under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation custom 
or usage of any state . . . subjects 
or causes to be subjected any 
citizen . . . to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or amenities secured 
by the constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the parties injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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The purpose of the civil rights statute is to 
compensate persons for injury caused by deprivation of 
constitutional rights. Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468 
(10th Cir. 1985) . 
There are two and only two elements to a cause of 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983f both of which unquestionably 
exist in this case: (1) a citizen must have been denied a 
federal right; and (2) the denial must have been under the 
color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 
(1980). 
It is absolutely clear that the actions of West 
Jordan in passing the seven percent ordinance and in 
collecting the fees from the subdividers were actions taken 
under the color of state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 
184 (1961) (misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law 
made possible only because the wrongdoer is "with the 
authority of state law"). It is when the execution of a 
governmental policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers 
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 
represent official policy, inflicts the injury, that the 
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. Monell 
v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 
(1978). 
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The city's collection of the seven percent fee 
was clearly a deprivation of property within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Cash is property for due process 
purposes. Coleman v. Turpin, 697 F.2d 1341 1344 (10th Cir. 
1982) . 
The only remaining issue is whether plaintiff's 
rights to procedural due process were denied by the city. 
Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural due 
process. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 
1983). 
[Elvery significant deprivation whether 
permanent or temporary of any interest 
which is qualified as property under 
the due process clause must be 
proceeded by notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case . . . . 
Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980). 
In Call IIIf the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally 
found that there was no notice and no hearing. 
[W]e hold that because the statute calls 
for a public hearing, our legislature 
contemplated something more than a 
regular city counsel meeting held . . . 
without specific advance notice to the 
public that the proposed ordinance would 
be considered. 
Call III at 183. 
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Notice to be effective must alert the 
public to the nature and scope of the 
ordinance that is being adopted. 
Call III at 183. 
One's imagination must be stretched 
beyond reasonable limits to accept 
the master plan hearing as satisfying the 
public hearing requirement . . . . The 
ordinance was not even drafted until 
months after the master plan public 
hearing. 
Call III at 182. 
There is no dispute that West Jordan, acting under 
color of state law, took $16,576 of the subdivider's property 
without notice and without the hearing required by statute 
and by the due process clause. Thus, West Jordan, undeniab-
ly, deprived Call and Jenkins of their procedural rights to 
due process of law, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The denial of due process in this case, is 
analytically similar to the denial of due process in Adler v. 
Lynch, 415 F.Supp. 705 (D. Neb. 1976). In Adler, the 
plaintiff received no notice that the zoning variance 
previously granted to her would be reviewed by the board of 
commissioners at one of the board's regular meetings. At 
that meeting, the board rescinded the variance. As a result, 
the court stated: 
It seems clear to the court that the 
plaintiff has been subjected to a 
13 
deprivation of due process of law by 
being denied proper notice of an 
opportunity to effectively participate in 
the proceedings of December 18. 
Adler at 711. 
The present case is also analytically parallel to 
Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1985). In 
Lavicky, the state seized the plaintiff's pickup truck 
because it believed some of the parts of the truck were 
stolen. The court found a violation of the plaintiff's 
procedural due process rights when the state disposed of the 
truck without following the statutory procedure for determin-
ing ownership of the allegedly stolen property prior to its 
disposition. Lavicky at 473. In a similar manner, West 
Jordan violated the plaintiff's procedural due process rights 
when it required the plaintiff to pay a fee that was not 
justified because the city had not followed statutory 
procedures. 
The fact that the subdividers received a refund of 
their money does not redress their procedural due process 
rights. 
[A] deprivation of procedural due process 
is an independent constitutional tort 
actionable under § 1983 with or without 
proof of actual injury. 
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Burt v. Able, 585 F.2d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1978); see also 
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-267 (1978). 
In summary, the Utah Supreme Court previously, in 
this case, found that there was no notice and no public 
hearing. There is no dispute that West Jordan acted under 
color of state law when it deprived the subdividers of their 
$16,576. The subdividers were entitled to judgment in their 
favor on their § 1983 civil rights claim. 
B. THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 
CONSIDERATION OP ATTORNEY FEES 
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
1. Call and Jenkins are Entitled to Attorney Fees Pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
Because the subdividers are entitled to a judgment 
on their civil rights claim, they are also entitled to have 
the court consider their claim for attorney fees pursuant to 
Section 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That section provides that in any 
action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections [42 
U.S.C. § 1983] the court may, in its discretion, allow the 
prevailing party other than the United State a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of the costs 
Even if only nominal damages are recovered, it does 
not diminish the plaintiff's eligibility for attorney fees 
under § 1988. Burt v. Able, 585 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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The reason the lower court did not consider 
plaintiff's application for attorney fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988/ is because it was under the mistaken impres-
sion that it did not have authority under Call III to enter a 
judgment on a civil rights claim- (Transcript Proceedings, 
September 11, 1987, pp.16-19, hereafter "Tw.) (T.pp.16-17.) 
In Call III, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "We 
remand this case to the trial court to enter judgment 
consistent with this opinion." Call III at 184. When an 
appellate court remands a case to the trial court, the issues 
decided upon appeal cannot be acted upon or decided contrary 
to the way they were decided in the appellate court. 
However, new issues may be raised so long as they do not 
cover issues specifically foreclosed by the appellate court. 
Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 
P.2d 153 (1948). see generally Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 
180, 181 (Utah 1986). On remand, the lower court has 
jurisdiction to take any action as justice may require under 
the circumstances, as long as it is not inconsistent with the 
mandate and judgment of the appellate court. Fullerton 
Lumbar Co. v. Torborq, 80 N.W.2d 461 (Wis. 1957). It is the 
trial court's duty to rule on issues not ruled upon by the 
16 
Utah Supreme Court. Eckard v. Smith, 545 P. 2d 501 (Utah 
1976) • 
In this case, the mandate to the lower court was 
only to enter judgment consistent with the Supreme Court's 
opinion. Call III at 184. Because the Supreme Court held 
i 
that the ordinance was invalid for the City's failure to hold 
a hearing, recovery for violation of procedural due process 
is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's mandate. In 
fact, the finding that the City acted contrary to statutory 
procedures is elemental to the plaintiff's § 1983 civil 
rights claim. see Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468 (10th 
Cir. 1985). The lower court erred when it reasoned that it 
did not have authority to rule on Call's and Jenkins's due 
process claim. 
In Shapiro Burnstein & Co. v. Jerry Voqle Music 
Co. , 161 F.2d 406 (2nd Cir. 1947), .^he court used the same 
language contained in Call III in reversing and remanding a 
judgment in a copyright infringement action relating to a 
1912 copyright. In clarifying its prior opinion, the court 
noted that it had not discussed any question related to a 
1914 renewal of a copyright. However, the remand and 
mandate did not bar the district court from reconsidering an 
17 
initial ruling on the 1914 renewal. Explaining the lower 
courts' powers on remand, the appellate court stated: 
We reversed the judgment, remanding the 
case for entry of a judgment consistent 
with this opinion. This permits the 
district judge to enter any judgment 
which he thinks is consistent with our 
opinion. He may consider whether the 
1914 version was a joint work or a new 
work and whether the principals enun-
ciated with respect to the 1912 version 
are likewise applicable to the 1919 
version. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court permitted the 
lower court to enter any judgment consistent with Call III. 
The court could and should have considered whether the City's 
failure to hold a hearing deprived Call and Jenkins of their 
constitutional rights to due process. There is no require-
ment for the Utah Supreme Court to specifically tell the 
lower court to enter judgment on the civil rights claim. 
Rather, the lower court was required to consider all issues 
not ruled upon on the appeal and to enter a judgment 
consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. Under these 
facts, the lower court erred when it ruled it could not enter 
judgment on the civil rights claim because the Utah Supreme 
Court had not specifically ordered the lower court to do so. 
This court' should remand the case to the trial judge to 
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enable him to exercise his discretion on the attorney's fee 
application. 
C. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY 
FEES PURSUANT TO U.R.C.P. 11 
1. Factual Background. 
After plaintiffs amended their complaint, a core 
issue was whether or not a public hearing had been held. 
West Jordan claimed that a meeting of August 27, 1974 was the 
public hearing. It is true that the August 27, 1974 meeting 
was a public hearing. However, it was a public hearing on a 
different issue (master plan). Neither at trial, nor in any 
post-trial proceeding, has West Jordan ever cited a scintil-
la of evidence to show that the August 27, 1974 "public 
hearing" was on the subject of the seven percent fee. 
Indeed, at the close of the trial, the judge stated: "There 
was no evidence given to the court about a public hearing." 
(T. Sept. 2, 1982 at p.72.) 
In Call III, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
One's imagination must be stretched 
beyond rational limits to accept the 
master plan public hearing as satisfying 
the public hearing requirements of §10-9-
25. 
Call III, at p.183. 
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2. Legal Analysis. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that every pleading, motion and other paper be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual 
name. Th^ signature of that attorney constitutes a certifi-
cate by him that (1) he has read the pleading, motion or 
paper and that to the best of his knowledge and after 
reasonable inquiry (2) the pleadingf motion or paper is well 
grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law and (3) that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. The 
penalty for signing the pleading, motion or paper in 
violation of these three requirements include a reasonable 
attorney's fee. If the pleading was signed in bad faith, 
Rule 11 requires that sanctions be enclosed. 
A refusal to invoke Rule 11 sanctions constitutes 
error as a matter of law. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 
F.2d 1168, 1174, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1985); F.R.C.P. Rule 26, 
Advisory Committee Note. The sufficiency of a pleading or 
motion and the determination to impose sanctions are reviewed 
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under a de novo standard- Donaldsen v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1581 
(11th Cir. 1987); Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New 
York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985). 
In the present case, the West Jordan City attorney 
signed the following papers asserting that West Jordan held a 
public hearing after the drafting of %he ordinance and prior 
to its adoption by West Jordan City: Answer of West Jordan 
to Plaintiff's Complaint dated April 7, 1981; Answers to 
Plaintiff's Interrogatories dated March 16, 1982; Defendant's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities to Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated April 6, 1982; and Defendant's 
Reply Brief to Plaintiff's Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
In each instance, it was asserted that West Jordan 
had held the required public hearing, but at trial, no 
evidence whatsoever was put on that a public hearing had been 
held. The pleadings, motions and papers were not well 
grounded in fact and the West Jordan Attorney knew it. 
This case is analytically comparable to Frasier v. 
Cast, 771 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1985). frasier involved a civil 
rights action arising out of a warrantless entry to a house. 
As a defense, the defendant alleged the entry to the house 
was warraated under the circumstances. At trial, the 
deputy's testimony indicated that he was not motivated bv 
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emergency but that he was concerned with preserving another 
officer's life. 
The trial court, after reviewing the facts, was 
convinced the court appellant's counsel could not reasonably 
have believed his own case and awarded attorney fees. 
Similarly, in the present case, the West Jordan attorney must 
have known that West Jordan's public hearing defense was 
frivolous, and attorney fees should be awarded. 
Not content with only constructing defenses not 
well grounded in fact, the West Jordan Attorney, subsequent 
to Call III, began making assertions not grounded in law. He 
argued that West Jordan was immune from civil rights claims 
and told the court, "I am familiar with these things 
because . . . I as city attorney have to pay attention to 
these things." What he didn't tell the court was that the 
United States Supreme Court, in Owen v. City of Independence, 
445 U.S. 622 (1980) squarely held that cities (West Jordan) 
have no immunity, none, whatsoever. As a result of West 
Jordan's conduct, plaintiffs' attorney spent five hours 
researching and responding to the immunity allegations. 
Plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees. (R.1916-1919.) 
c. f. Rodqers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 771 F.2d 194 
(7th Cir. 1985) . 
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In summary, plaintiffs are entitled to attorney 
fees pursuant to U.R.C.P. 11. The case should be remanded 
with instructions to the lower coiirt to determine the 
reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded. 
D. THE CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR JOINDER 
OF THE INDISPENSABLE PARTY SUBDIVIDERS 
In Call I, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
impact fees paid by the subdividers to the City of West 
Jordan was a trust fund. The court said: 
These observations are also pertinent: 
Although the money collected from the 
plaintiff in this case was deposited in 
the City's general fundf it should not be 
assumed that the money thus becomes 
usable for other purposes by the City 
and it is of no special benefit to the 
areas sought to be subdivided. On the 
contrary that it will be used for its 
stated purpose is assured . . . by the 
fact that the recognized principal is 
that if money is collected from the 
public for a specific purpose, it becomes 
a trust fund committed to the carrying 
out of that purpose. (Emphasis added.) 
Call I at 320. 
In Call III/ the Utah Supreme Court held that West 
Jordan's impact fee ordinance was void ab initio: 
We therefore hold that the West Jordan 
C;ity Ordinance 33, §9-C-8(2) (1975) is 
invalid and void ab initio. 
Call III at 183. 
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The Supreme Court having first found that the paid 
impact fees were a trust fund, and then having declared the 
Ordinance creating the fund as void from the beginning, 
raises the issue of who owns the fund when the trust fails 
for illegality. The unequivocal answer is that the settlors 
of the trust (the subdividers) own the fund. see In Re: 
Professional Air Traffic Controller Organization, 724 F.2d 
205 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In Re: Mooney's Estate, 267 N.W. 197 
(Neb. 1936); see generally Bell v. Harrison, 498 P.2d 397 
(Ore. 1972). When the trust fails, the settlors are entitled 
to the trust property. G. Bogert & G. Bogert, the Law of 
Trusts and Trustees §468 (Rev.2d Ed. 1977); Restatement 
(Second) Trusts §411 (1984). 
The subdividers are the only persons who are 
entitled to the West Jordan impact fee trust fund. 
To protect the interests of the subdividers in the 
impact fee trust fund, plaintiffs Call and Jenkins filed the 
lawsuit as a class action. In Call III, the Supreme Court 
disallowed the class because the size of the class was too 
small. The court said: 
[W]e are here dealing with a class whose 
members have been identified. They are 
developers engaged in business whose 
claims are not so insubstantial that 
joinder or individual suits would not 
merit the cost . . . Given the facts of 
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this case, we cannot hold the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying class 
action status. 
Call III, supra at 183-84. 
Clearly, the foregoing language shows the Utah 
Supreme Court anticipated the subdividers would subsequently 
be joined in this action. 
The Utah Supreme Court's expectation is consistent 
with the framework set out in Rules 19 and 23 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rules i9 and 23 provide the 
framework for joining indispensable parties before the court. 
Rule 19 provides for the joinder of indispensable parties but 
states that the rule is subject to the class action provi-
sions of Rule 23 (U.R.C.P. 19(d)). There is no need to join 
parties under rule 19 if the case proceeds as a class action 
under Rule 23. see Matthies v. Seymour, 270 F.2d 365 (2d 
Cir. 1959); Stevens v. Lumis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n.9 (1st Cir. 
1964). 
Consistent with the foregoing authority and the 
expectations of the Utah Supreme Court, Call and Jenkins, 
subsequent to the Call III remand, moved the court to join 
subdividers who paid impact fees as party plaintiffs in the 
above-entitled action. Because the subdividers were the only 
one's who had an interest in the West Jordan impact fee trust 
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fund, they were indispensable parties. A complete accounting 
or restoration of the trust assets could not be made without 
them. see Wash v Centeino, 692 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Matthies v. Seymour, 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959); G. Bogert 
and G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §522 at 36, (Rev. 2nd 
ed. .1978); 3A J. Moore and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal 
Practice, para- 1908 at 19-170, (2d ed, 1982). 
The court's failure to grant the motion is 
reversible error and requires this case to be remanded for 
joinder of those (subdividers) who have an interest in that 
fund. Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987). 
A case analytically similar to this one is Cass 
Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 63 F.R.D. 34 
(D.S.D. 1974). In that case, the plaintiffs were customers 
of an electric company. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
electric company made rate increases in violation of 
municipal ordinances. The plaintiffs sought a refund of the 
overcharge. The case was brought as a class action. The 
court ruled that all customers of the electric company were 
indispensable parties under F.R.C.P. 19. The court reasoned: 
If Cass Clay remained in federal court 
and succeeded in obtaining a judgment, a 
distribution plan would have to be 
formulated. In order to determine how 
much is due and owing to Cass Clay, this 
court would have to determine how much 
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was due and owing to each individual 
class member. The fund is constant and 
each individual class member's share is 
dependent upon their share owing to every 
other class member. 
* * * 
I think those class members are indispen-
sable according to that rule. 
• • • 
It is therefore the co 
court that the interests of the utility 
customers in the fund . . . are joint, 
common and undivided. 
Cass Clay at 37,39. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court in Hiltsey v. 
Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987), remanded a case to join as 
an indispensable party a trust beneficiary not before the 
court. Similarly, this court should remand this case to join 
all the subdividers who have an interest in the West Jordan 
impact fee trust fund. 
D. * THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD 
COSTS PAID BY THE PLAINTIFFS TO 
COURT APPOINTED MASTER AND FOR THE 
AUDIT OF WEST JORDAN'S BOOKS 
1. Factual and Procedural Background. 
During the litigation and before the lower court 
ruled on tfre issue of class certification, plaintiffs served 
a set of interrogatories on West Jordan City asking West 
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Jordan to identify which subdividers paid impact fees to West 
Jordan, how much was paid and what was done with the 
subdivider's money. The defendant refused to answer the 
simple interrogatories and said: 
The answers to these interrogatories may 
be determined or ascertained from the 
business records of the City of West 
Jordan or from an examination, audit or 
inspection of such business records and 
the burden of discovery in ascertaining 
the answers is substantially the same for 
the plaintiff as the defendant. 
(R.187-188.) 
Thereafter, plaintiff sent CPA Gerald Sharkey to 
examine the business records. He discovered: 
1. Not all of the business records were 
available. 
2. The business records consisted of 34 boxes 
commingled with police reports and other 
irrelevant documents. 
3. Some documents were in a safe. 
4. Some documents were in an employee's lounge. 
(R.749-750.) 
He determined that West Jordan did not maintain 
detailed records related to fixed asset account groups 
contrary to the Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act and the West 
Jordan answer to interrogatories. (R.349-350.) After 
various motions to compel, the lower court, appointed a 
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master to determine who paid what to the City of West Jordan 
and what was done with the money. 
[T]he master shall examine the records 
of West Jordan and determine the 
consideration paid for each subdivider 
and the subdivider's compliance with West 
Jordan's flood control afid park fee 
ordinance, the subject of t^is lawsuit. 
(R.427.) The Master's report was consistent with the 
affidavit of Gerald Sharkey. The Master concluded that the 
impact fee should have had special accounting treatment and 
that there should have been a fixed asset ledger and 
description of all fixed assets. (R.432-442.) 
Because the information sought by Call and Jenkins 
was not in the documents identified by West Jordan, and 
because the Master, after examining the records, could not 
tell what was done with the impact fees, the court punished 
West Jordan by requiring the City to prove how it "spent the 
7 percent subdivision fees paid by plaintiffs." (R.1030-
1032.) 
After the final remand of this case, plaintiffs 
sought to have taxed against West Jordan, the costs of the 
court appointed master which was $1,495, and the $4,650 
plaintiffs paid in accounting fees. 
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2. Legal Analysis, 
(a) Master's Fees. 
Master's fees are determined in connection with a 
bill of costs. United States v. Yonkers Bd of Ed., 108 
F.R.D. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). While the courts have some 
discretion, they uniformly impose the master's fee either 
upon the losing party. Capra, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 507 
F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1978), or upon the party whose conduct 
necessitated the reference. 3A J. Moore and J. Lucas 
Moore's Federal Practice, para. 53.04[1] at 53-56 (2d ed. 
1987). In this case, both factors show that the master's fee 
should have been imposed upon West Jordan City. 
Call and Jenkins are the prevailing parties. Thus, 
the master's fee should be imposed upon West Jordan, the 
losing party. In K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471 
(9th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff prevailed on only two of his 
twelve claims but the court held that the judgment rendered 
on those two claims made plaintiffs the prevailing party and 
allowed plaintiff to recover, as costs, the amount the 
plaintiffs paid toward the master's compensation. Similarly, 
in this case, while plaintiff did not prevail on all of its 
claims, it/did prevail on obtaining a judgment against the 
City of West Jordan for the impact fees paid. The expense of 
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the master should be imposed upon West Jordan, the losing 
party• 
Further, it was the conduct of West Jordan that 
necessitated the appointment of the master. The inter-
rogatories submitted to the City of West Jordan were not 
difficult. They asked who paid what fees and how were the 
fees spent. West Jordan refused to answer the 
interrogatories and directed the plaintiffs to its business 
records. The business records were in such a slip shod form, 
it was impossible for the plaintiffs' accountant to perform 
an accurate audit. The court then appointed a master. The 
master discovered that he too could not locate the informa-
tion within West Jordan's records. After that, the court 
correctly placed the burden on West Jordan to prove what it 
did with the money. 
If West Jordan had answered tne interrogatories, 
the expenses of a master would not have been incurred. 
Similarly, if West Jordan had not violated Rule 11 as stated 
in Part VII C of this brief, plaintiffs would not have 
incurred the expense of a master. 
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(b) Accountant Costs. 
A similar analysis dictates that the court should 
award plaintiff the costs of its accountant in inspecting the 
records- While expert fees are not generally recoverable as 
costs Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), this is 
an unusual case. If West Jordan had answered the inter-
rogatories and not falsely alleged that the information was 
readily available from its business records, plaintiffs would 
not have incurred the expenses of an accountant- Therefore, 
the lower court should have awarded the auditing expenses as 
a cost. see American Timber & Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 
558 P.2d 1211 (Ore. 1976); Andrecikopoulos v. Broadmoor 
Management, 670 P.2d 435 (Colo- App- 1983). 
Further, if West Jordan had not violated Rule 11 as 
set forth in Part VII C of this Brief, plaintiffs would not 
have incurred the expense of an accountant. The lower court 
could and would have ruled that the ordinance was void and 
awarded Call and Jenkins a refund-
For these reasons, the lower court erred in failing 
to award plaintiff as costs, (1) the master's fee paid by the 
plaintiffs; and (2) the plaintiffs costs incurred by its 
accountant'js attempted audit. 
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CONCLUSION 
West Jordan deprived Call and Jenkins of their 
procedural rights of due process, A § 1983 civil rights 
judgment should be entered in favor of Call and Jenkins. 
Because West Jordan violated Rule 11, Call and 
Jenkins should be awarded a judgment for attorney fees. In 
the alternative
 f the case should be remanded for the lower 
court to determine attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C- § 
1988. 
The master's and accountant's costs incurred in an 
examination of West Jordan's records should be taxed to West 
Jordan. 
day of Sfl//\ I , 1988 DATED t h i s /hh  /wf /
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys /fcsr Plaint tiff s'~\ 
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ADDENDUM 
John CALL and Clark Jenkins, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 15908. 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
Dec 26, 1979. 
Subdividers brought action to challenge 
validity of ordinance adopted by city which 
required subdividers to dedicate 7% of pro-
posed subdivision land to city or to pay 
equivalent of that value in cash to be used 
for flood control and/or park and recreation 
facilities. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, David K. Winder, J., upheld 
validity of ordinance and denied subdivid-
e d requests for injunctive relief and dam-
ages, and subdividers-appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Crockett, C. J., upheld validity 
of ordinance. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred and filed opin-
ion. 
Wilkins, J., dissented and filed opinion 
in which Maughan, J., concurred. 
1. Zoning and Planning <fc=»86 
City had authority to enact ordinance 
which required subdividers to dedicate 7% 
of proposed subdivision land, or pay equiva-
lent of that value in cash, to be used for 
flood control and/or park and recreation 
facilities. (Per Crockett, C. J., with one 
Judge concurring and one Judge specially 
concurring.) U.C.A.1953, 10-8-84, 10-9-1, 
10-9-3, 10-9-19 et seq., 1O-9-20, 10-9-22, 
10-9-25. 
2. Zoning and Planning <s=>86 
Fact that dedication of 7% of proposed 
subdivision land area or its cash value re-
dounded to benefit of subdivision as well as 
to general welfare of whole community did 
not invalidate ordinance which provided for 
such land dedication. (Per Crockett. C. J.. 
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with one Justice concurring and one Justice 
specially concurring.) 
3. Trusts *»30%<1) 
If money is collected from public for 
specific purpose, it becomes a trust fund 
committed to carrying out that purpose. 
(Per Crockett, C. J., with one Justice con-
curring and one Justice specially concur-
ring.) 
4. Eminent Domain <*=>2(L2) 
City, which received $16,576 from sub-
dividers under ordinance requiring subdi-
viders to dedicate 7% of proposed subdivi-
sion land area or to pay equivalent of that 
value in cash to be used for flood control 
and/or park and recreation facilities, was 
not taking land under power of eminent 
domain without following requirement of 
paying just compensation but was merely 
imposing reasonable regulations on subdi-
viders as prerequisite for permitting cre-
ation of subdivision. (Per Crockett, C. J., 
with one Justice concurring and one Justice 
specially concurring.) 
5. Zoning and Planning <*»602 
Question of percentage of land in sub-
division to be committed to public purpose 
is within prerogative of city council to de-
termine, and so long as it is within reasona-
ble limits, so that it cannot be characterized 
as capricious or arbitrary, courts will not 
interfere therewith. (Per Crockett, C. J., 
with one Justice concurring and one Justice 
specially concurring.) 
6. Zoning and Planning <*=>86 
Ordinance which required subdividers 
to dedicate 7% of proposed subdivision land 
or to pay equivalent of that value in cash to 
be used for flood control and/or park and 
recreation facilities was within scope of 
powers granted to city so that it could plan 
for general good of community as well as 
for newly created subdivision. (Per Crock-
ett, C. J., with one Justice concurring and 
one Justice specially concurring.) 
7. Zoning and Planning <*» 382.4 
Payment to city of cash equivalent of 
7% of subdivision land area, which was 
made Dursuant to ordinance for general 
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purpose of parks, recreation facilities and 
flood control, was not necessarily to be used 
solely for subdivided subdivision or any 
other particular one; it did not prevent city 
from imposing reasonable condition of con-
struction of storm sewers and did not pre-
vent city from refusing to credit subdivid-
e s with cost of storm sewers against cash 
they paid. (Per Crockett, C. J., with one 
Justice concurring and one Justice specially 
concurring.) 
Robert J. DeBry and Valden P. Living-
ston, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Nick J. Colessides, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs John Call and Clark Jenkins, 
subdividers, brought this action in which 
they challenge the validity of an ordinance 
adopted by the defendant City which re-
quires that subdividers dedicate 7 percent 
of the land to the city, or pay the equiva-
lent of that value in cash, to be used for 
flood control and/or parks and recreation 
facilities. The district court upheld the va-
lidity of the ordinance and denied plaintiffs' 
request for injunctive relief and damages. 
The latter appeal. 
Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance is 
invalid because: (1) it is not within the 
City's granted powers; (2) the land or the 
money required is not for the benefit of the 
subdivision, but rather the City as a whole; 
(3) that the City is attempting to exercise 
the power of eminent domain without fol-
lowing the requirements thereof and paying 
just compensation; and (4) it unlawfully 
imposes a tax. 
On January 21, 1975, the City amended 
an existing ordinance (No. 33) relating to 
subdivisions by adding the following: 
Section 9-C-8(a). In addition to all the 
other requirements prescribed under this 
ordinance the subdivider shall be required 
to dedicate seven percent (7.0%) of the 
land area of the proposed subdivision to 
the public use for the benefit and use of 
the citizens of the City of West Jordan 
or in the alternative at the op-
tion of the governing body of the City, 
the City may accept the equivalent value 
of the land in cash if it deems advisable. 
Sections 9-C-8(b) and (d) further provide 
that the money received "shall be used by 
the City for its flood control and/or parks 
and recreational facilities" and that if the 
City elects to receive money in lieu of land, 
payment shall be made "by the subdivider 
on or before final approval of the plat is 
given by the City Council." 
On May 2, 1977, the plaintiffs presented 
to the City two plats and maps for a pro-
posed "Wescall subdivision" which, if ap-
proved, would result in the future develop-
ment of 92 lots on about 30 acres of land 
located in the City. When the City exer-
cised its option to accept money in lieu of 
land, plaintiff Clark Jenkins paid, under 
protest, $16,576.00, representing about 7 
percent of the value of his land. The City 
Council then approved the subdivision and 
the plats were recorded. The City refused 
plaintiffs' demand to refund the money and 
this action resulted. 
In rejecting plaintiffs' attack upon the 
ordinance, the trial court stated in its mem-
orandum decision: 
As it affects the plaintiffs, it is the 
opinion of this Court that the City of 
West Jordan, Utah's ordinance 33, as 
amended January 21, 1975, is valid and 
constitutional. It is further the Court's 
opinion that there has been no taking of 
the plaintiffs property by the defendant 
without just compensation nor has the 
defendant levied an invalid tax upon the 
plaintiffs. See Sees. 10-9-1 through 10-
9-30, U.C.A. 1953. [Citing cases.] 
The Authority of the City 
[1] It is not questioned that cities have 
no inherent sovereign power, but only those 
granted by the legislature.1 But it must be 
realized that it is impractical for statutes to 
spell out to the last detail all of the things 
city governments must do to perform the 
1. Johnson v. Sandv Citv Com 28 Utah 2d 22 4<V7 P 2H \(UA nQT>\ 
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functions imposed upon them by law. This 
Court has in numerous cases recognized this 
and has held that cities have those powers 
which are expressly granted and also those 
necessarily implied to carry out such re-
sponsibilities.2 
There are a series of statutes through 
which the City derives its authority to enact 
ordinances of the character here in ques-
tion. Sec. 10-&-84, U.C.A. 1953, grants to 
cities the authority and the duty 
. . to preserve the health, safety 
and good order of the city and its inhabit-
ants. 
This idea is carried forward and echoed in 
Section 10-9-1, U.CJL 1953, which provides 
that: 
For the purpose of promoting health, 
safety, morals and the general welfare of 
the community the legislative body of 
cities and towns is empowered to regulate 
and restrict the location and 
use of buildings, structures and land for 
trade, industry, residence or other pur-
poses. 
Further dealing with that subject and more 
specific as to the establishment of parks, 
Section lJt-9-3 states that such regulations 
. . . shall be made in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan designed to 
facilitate adequate provision for 
transportation, water, sewage, schools, 
paries and other public requirements. 
The Municipal Planning Enabling Act3 
empowers a city to have a planning com-
mission which may "adopt and certify to 
the legislative body, a master plan for the 
physical development of the municipality." 4 
Section 10-9-22 states that the planning 
commission "shall have such powers as may 
be necessary to enable it to perform its 
functions and promote municipal planning." 
Significantly/ Section 10-9-25 then pro-
vides: 
In exercising the powers granted to it 
by the act, the planning commission shall 
2. See Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 
124 P.2d 537 (1942); and Butt v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., Utah, 550 P.2d 202 (1976). 
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prepare regulations governing the subdi-
vision of land within the municipality. A 
public hearing thereon shall be held by 
the legislative body, after which the legis-
lative body may adopt said regulations 
for the municipality. 
[all emphasis herein added.] 
If the above statutes are viewed together, 
and in accordance with their intent and 
purpose, as they should be, it seems plain 
enough that the ordinance in question is 
within the scope of authority and responsi-
bility of the city government in the promo-
tion of the "health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare" of the community.5 
Just how essential and desirable it is that 
cities have such authority in planning their 
growth is brought into sharp focus by re-
flecting, on the one hand, upon the condi-
tions in the slum and ghetto areas of vari-
ous cities, where there are none, or inade-
quate, parks and playgrounds and, on the 
other, upon the enrichment of life which 
has been conferred on other cities where 
there are parks, plazas, recreational and 
cultural areas (some of which are very fa-
mous) for the use of the public 
In modern times of ever-increasing popu-
lation and congestion, real estate developers 
buy land at high prices. From the com-
bined pressures of competition and desire 
for gain, they often squeeze every lot they 
can into some labyrinthian plan, with only 
the barest minimum for tortious and circui-
tous streets, without any arterial ways 
through such subdivisions, and with little or 
no provision for parks, recreation areas, or 
even for reasonable "elbow room." The 
need for some general planning and control 
is apparent, and makes manifest the wis-
dom underlying the delegation of powers to 
the cities, as is done in the statutes above 
referred to. 
As undeveloped land is improved, it is 
also important that some provision for flood 
control be made. To the extent that the 
4. 10-9-20, U.C.^. 1953. 
5. Language from Sec. 10-9-1, U.C.A. 1953. 
3. 10-9-19 et seq.f U.C.A. 1953. 
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establishment of subdivisions increases the 
need for flood control measures or recrea-
tional facilities, it is both fair and essential 
that subdividers be required to contribute 
to the costs of providing those facilities. 
Lack of Benefit to the Subdivision 
[2] In their point No. (2), the plaintiffs 
attack the ordinance on the ground that the 
land dedicated (or the money in lieu there-
of) is not to be used solely and exclusively 
for the benefit of the created subdivision. 
They point to the provision that the land is 
received "for the benefit and use of the 
citizens of the City of West Jordan" and the 
money is used for "its [West Jordan's] flood 
control and/or parks and recreation facili-
ties." 
We agree that the dedication should have 
some reasonable relationship to the needs 
created by the subdivision.1 But in the 
planning for the expansion of a city, it is 
obvious that no particular percentage of 
each subdivision, or of each lot, could be 
used as a park or playground in that partic-
ular subdivision; and likewise, that it could 
not be so used for flood control. But it is so 
plain as to hardly require expression that if 
the purpose of the ordinance is properly 
carried out, it will redound to the benefit of 
the subdivision as well as to the general 
welfare of the whole community. The fact 
that it does so, rather than solely benefiting 
the individual subdivision, does not impair 
the validity of the ordinance.7 
[3] These observations are also perti-
nent: Although the money which was col-
lected from the plaintiffs in this case was 
6. See statements in Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, 
Inc. v. Planning Commission of Danbury, 27 
ConiLSup. 74, 230 A^d 45 (1967); Krughoff v. 
City of Napervillc, 68 IlUd 352. 12 HLDec. 185, 
369 N.EL2d 892 (1977); Home Builders Ass'n v. 
City of Kansas City, Mo., 555 S.W.2d 832 
(1977). 
7. Ayres v. City Council 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 
1 (1949); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. 
City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 630, 484 P 2d 606 (1971). 
8. 15 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 
39.45 states that: "Special funds are often cre-
ated for a particular purpose, and in 
such case the general rule is that they cannot 
deposited in the City's general fund, it 
should not be assumed that the money thus 
becomes usable for other purposes by the 
City and is of no special benefit to the area 
sought to be subdivided. On the contrary, 
that it will be used for its stated purpose is 
assured, first, by the integrity and good 
faith of the public officials charged with 
that responsibility; and second, by the fact 
that the recognized principle is that if mon-
ey is collected from the public for a specific 
purpose, it becomes a trust fund committed 
to the carrying out of that purpose.8 
The Eminent Domain Issue 
[4] There is an obvious fallacy in the 
plaintiffs' argument that the City has not 
followed the proper procedure for taking 
plaintiffs' property under eminent domain. 
This is not a proceeding initiated by the 
City to acquire property.* It has indicated 
no desire to compel the plaintiff to subdi-
vide their property, nor to dedicate any part 
of i t The plaintiffs are the moving parties, 
and as a prerequisite for permitting the 
creation of the subdivision, the City, under 
the powers conferred upon it as herein-
above discussed, can and does impose rea-
sonable regulations.1* 
Invalidity as a Tax 
Plaintiffs urge that the requirements of 
the ordinance in question are but a revenue-
raising scheme for the purpose of meeting 
the financial needs of the City, and thus 
constitute an improper levy of a tax upon 
their property, this labeling is but an ex-
be used for any other purpose" and that 
'*. . a fund raised by a municipality for a 
special purpose is a trust fund, and equity will, 
in a proper case, interfere to prevent its diver-
sion." (Citing cases.) 
9. See Ayres v. City Council, supra, note 7; 
Petterson v. City of Napennlle, 9 I11.2d 233, 137 
N.E.2d 371 (1956). 
10. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone 
County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182, 187 (1964); 
City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 77 N.M. 86, 
419 P2d 460 (1966); Mid-Contment Builders, 
Inc. v Midwest City. Okl.. 539 P2d 1377 
(1975). 
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ercise in semantics which misconstrues the 
purpose of the ordinance to make another 
attack upon it It has been adjudicated 
that such an ordinance, if reasonably de-
signed and carried out for the purpose in-
tended, is a proper form of planning for the 
good of the community, and is not such a 
prohibited tax.11 
[5] The question as to the percentage of 
the land in the subdivision (in this instance, 
7 percent) to be committed to the public 
purpose is within the prerogative of the 
City Council to determine, and so long as it 
is within reasonable limits, so that it cannot 
be characterized as capricious or arbitrary, 
the courts will not interfere therewith.12 
[6] In harmony with what has been said 
above, it is our opinion that the ordinance 
under attack is within the scope of the 
powers granted to the City so that it can 
plan for the general good of the community 
as well as for the newly-created subdivi-
sions. 
We have decided the principal issue which 
was addressed by the parties in the district 
court, and on this appeal, as to the validity 
of the ordinance. However, we observe 
that in the averments of the affidavits, 
there are other matters which may need to 
be resolved on remand; and accordingly, it 
is deemed appropriate that we make some 
additional comments.13 
There is no question, but that the ordi-
nance should be applied fairly, and without 
favoritism or discrimination insofar as that 
can be accomplished. In view of the aver-
ment in plaintiffs' affidavit that that prin-
ciple has been violated, the trial court 
should be concerned with examination into 
and resolution of any legitimate issue raised 
thereon. 
[7] In his affidavit, plaintiff Clark Jen-
kins averred that he not only paid the $16,-
576 (assumed to be 7 percent of the value of 
11. Petterson v. City of Naperville, supra, note 
9; Jenad v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 
271 N.Y.S^d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966). 
12. For an excellent discussion of the vanous 
constitutional challenges that have been made 
regarding subdivision legislation, see Associat-
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the subdivision, $248,000) but was also re-
quired to dedicate .028 acres valued at 
$1,500; and to expend about $19,000 in con-
struction of a storm sewor (which plaintiff 
urges is flood control) before the City would 
approve the subdivision. He asserts that 
these amounts are in excess of the 7 percent 
required by the ordinance The City's affi-
davit states that it received the $16,576, but 
says nothing about receiving the other 
amounts just referred to. It is, of course, 
essential that the amount the City exacts 
pursuant to the ordinance is not more than 
the 7 percent of value of plaintiffs' proper-
ty it prescribes. 
Our final observation is on plaintiffs' ur-
gence that the $19,000 they expended in 
constructing a storm sewer should be cred-
ited upon their obligation under the ordi-
nance. From what has been said in this 
decision, it should be sufficiently plain that 
the 7 percent exacted pursuant to the ordi-
nance is for the general purpose of parks, 
recreation facilities and flood control, and is 
to be so administered and expended by the 
city government for that purpose; and that 
it is not necessarily to be used solely for the 
plaintiffs' subdivision or any other particu-
lar one. This does not in any way prevent 
the City from imposing other reasonable 
conditions upon the approval of a subdivi-
sion and proposed construction therein, in-
cluding requiring a storm sewer if the con-
ditions are such that it is needed in that 
subdivision for the protection of future resi-
dents thereof or other residents of the City. 
We therefore do not disagree with the 
City's requirement of the storm sewer, nor 
with its refusal to credit the plaintiff with 
the cost thereof on its 7 percent required by 
the ordinance. 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed 
and the case is remanded for further pro-
ed Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 
supra, note 7, and authorities therein cited. 
13. See Rule 76(a), U.R.C.P ; LeGrand Johnson 
Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P 2d 615 
(1966). 
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ceedings consistent with this opinion. No 
costs awarded. 
HALL, J., concurs. 
STEWART, Justice (concurring). 
I concur in the conclusion that § 9-C-8(a) 
of the ordinance of the City of West Jordan 
is authorized by § 10-8-84 U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended. This statute delegates to cities 
general police power to be used for the 
benefit of the city and its inhabitants. 
However, the ordinance in question clearly 
approaches constitutionally protected 
rights, h e., tne prohibition against the tak-
ing of private property without just com-
pensation. The power of a city, or for that 
matter of the state, to require subdividers 
to dedicate a portion of their land for public 
improvements is not without limitation. In 
my judgment, the Court should address the 
problem of what standards delineate a con-
stitutional and an unconstitutional forced 
dedication by a subdivider. The question is 
certainly one that will recur and ought to 
be resolved by the Court 
WILKINS, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent 
The majority opinion forms a perilous 
new rule today by impermissibly expanding 
municipal powers, for the first time in this 
State, beyond those granted cities and 
towns by our Legislature and beyond those 
recognized by subdivision, zoning, and mu-
nicipal government authorities, and it en-
dangers the sound precedent of narrowly 
construing municipal powers which has been 
developed in Salt Lake City v. Revene? 
Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake,2 Salt Lake City 
v. Sutter? Tooele City v. Elkington? Nance 
v. Mayflower Tavern? Parker v. Provo 
City? Nasfell v. Ogden City? Bohn v. Salt 
1. 101 Utah 504, 124 P2d 537 (1942). 
2. 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955). 
3. 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923). 
4. 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941). 
5. 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944). 
6. Utah. 543 P.2d 769 (1975). 
Lake City? Lark v. Whitehead? American 
Fork City v. Robinson?9 Layton City v 
Speth?1 and other cases. 
I shall relate my view of this case, as well 
as review what I perceive to be the correct 
legal principles applicable to it. All statu-
tory references are to Utah Code Annotat-
ed, 1953, as amended, unless otherwise indi-
cated. 
Subdividers have undertaken to develop a 
subdivision within the City's boundaries and 
have dedicated land area and installed 
storm sewer facilities within the subdivision 
and have additionally paid $16,576 to the 
City, all in response to City demands made 
under authority of the Ordinance as a pre-
requisite to subdivision approval. The rec-
ord and briefs indicate a dispute as to 
whether the land was dedicated and the 
money paid under protest. No formal writ-
ten protest appears in the record, but plain-
tiffs claim they attended a city council 
meeting in which they orally objected to the 
land dedication and fee payment 
Subdividers framed their complaint as a 
class action seeking a declaration of the 
invalidity of the Ordinance on their own 
behalf and on behalf of others similarly 
situated. Other than a general denial in its 
answer and the allegation that the class 
consisted of 28 subdividers rather than the 
100 alleged by plaintiffs buried within an 
affidavit on another subject, the City has 
totally failed to address, either here or be-
low, the Subdividers1 class action allega-
tions. The record does not indicate whether 
the District Court made any of the determi-
nations contemplated by Rule 23(a) or (b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but the 
Court disposed of the matter in an Order 
dated April 21,1978, denying the Subdivid-
ers' "Motion for Declaration of a Class Ac-
7. 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 (1952). 
8. 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2tf 591, 81 A.L.R. 215 (1932). 
9. 28 Utah 2d 343, 502 P.2d 557 (1972). 
10. 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930). 
11. Utah, 578 P.2d 828 (1978). 
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tion." The City's motion to dismiss was 
treated as one for summary judgment. On 
May 17, 1978, the District Court ruled in 
favor of the City's motion, and against the 
Subdividers' motion, that the Ordinance 
was valid and the City's demands were in 
conformity with it. 
Except for cities which operate under 
charter12 and derive their authority from 
Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, the cities of this State are "creatures 
of statute and limited in powers to those 
delegated by the legislature, "13 
All power and authority of our nonchar-
tered municipalities is derived through leg-
islative grant, and for the Ordinance under 
review here to be upheld, it must have been 
enacted pursuant to an enabling statute. 
Prior to the majority decision here, this 
Court recognized that legislative authority 
may be exercised by municipalities in only 
one of three ways. Justice Wolfe wrote in 
Salt Lake City v. Revene: 
It has been repeatedly stated by this 
court "that a municipal corporation pos-
sesses and can exercise the following 
powers, and no others: First, those grant-
ed in express words; second, those neces-
sarily or fairly implied in or incident to 
the powers expressly granted; third, 
those essential to the accomplishment of 
the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation,—not simply convenient, but 
indispensable." 1 Dillon Municipal Corpo-
ration, 5th Ed., p. 448, § 237; . . .M 
[Emphasis added.] 
and held therein that in the absence of a 
specific legislative grant of power the city 
had no authority to limit barbershop busi-
ness hours for health purposes under three 
statutory grants of power to cities and 
towns. One statute provided cities power 
to "license, tax, and regulate" barbershops. 
A second statute empowered cities to 
promulgate regulations "to secure the gen-
12. The City in this case does not represent 
itself to be chartered. 
13. Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, supra, note 2 at 
3 Utah 2d 387, 284 P.2d 703. 
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eral health of the city/' and the third broad-
ly delegated to cities authority to enact 
ordinances for the public health, safety, 
prosperity, morals, peace and good order, 
and comfort and convenience of the city 
and its inhabitants. That third statute now 
appears in our Code as § 10-8-84 and is 
relied upon by the City and the majority 
opinion as authority for the City to enact 
the Ordinance under attack here. 
In Salt Lake City v. Sutter,1* defendant's 
conviction for violating Salt Lake City's 
prohibition ordinance was reversed, this 
Court holding that the statute enabling 
cities to pass ordinances necessary to pro-
vide for the safety, health, morals, comfort 
and convenience, again the statute relied 
upon by the City and the majority opinion, 
did not authorize the City's legislation pro-
hibiting possession of intoxicating liquors. 
Whatever power or authority munici-
palities in this state have is derived from 
the Legislature. 
It will hardly be contended that the 
ordinance in question is "essential to the 
accomplishment of the declared objects 
and purposes of the corporation." As we 
have seen, it is not included within any 
express grant; nor is it necessarily or 
fairly implied as an incident to the pow-
ers expressly granted measured by the 
rule laid down by the authorities. 
It may be, and is, contended that the 
ordinance in question is only carrying out 
the general policy of the state as re-
flected by the legislative enactment mak-
ing it an offense against the state law for 
any person to knowingly have in his pos-
session without authority intoxicating li-
quors within the state. But the policy of 
the state cannot control in determining 
the powers of a municipality. Those 
powers must be measured and deter-
mined by the grants found in the charter 
or in the general laws purporting to enu-
merate such powers. 
14. Supra, note 1. Although cited by the major-
ity as authority for its position here, Revene 
held, m direct conflict with the majority, that 
the Ordinance enacted by the City exceeded the 
City's authority under the enabling statutes. 
15. Supra, note 3. 
We can see no escape from the conclu-
sion that the board of city commissioners 
of Salt Lake City was without authority 
to enact the ordinance in question on this 
appeal.1* 
The requirement that cities must have 
express authority to enact ordinances is not 
unique to Utah. McQuillin in Municipal 
Corporations, and Yokley, in The Law of 
Subdivisions, state as a general proposition 
that dedication ordinances require enabling 
legislation. 
In some jurisdictions, zoning-enabling 
statutes authorize local zoning bodies to 
require, as a condition precedent to devel-
opment, that subdividers dedicate por-
tions of their property for public pur-
poses, or pay an assessment in lieu of 
dedication. There must be express statu-
tory authority granting the power to mu-
nicipalities to impose such conditions, or 
at least language from which the inten-
tion to grant the power may be inferred, 
n 
Further, judicial scrutiny of a municipal 
ordinance differs from that imposed in the 
test of a State statute in that the usual 
presumption of validity of the sovereign's 
action does not apply. In the case of an 
ordinance, any reasonable doubt must be 
resolved against the municipality's power to 
enact it, and any questioned power must be 
denied18 
Neither party nor the majority opinion 
cites any Utah statute directly authorizing 
16. Id. at 61 Utah 540, 41, 216 P. 237. Also 
supporting this rule is Tooele City v. Elkington, 
supra, note 4. 
17. 8 McQuillin, Mun.Corp. § 25.146a (Rev. 
1976). 1 Yokley Mun. Corp. § 97 (Supp.1978, 
p. 179); Accord, Yokley, The Law of Subdivi-
sions § 15 (1963). 
18. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, supra, note 5; 
Parker v. Provo City, supra, note 6; Nasfell v. 
Ogden City, supra, note 7; Sait Lake City v. 
Revene, supra, note 1. 
19. Maps and plats to be acknowledged, certi-
fied, approved, and recorded. Such map or 
plat shall be acknowledged by such owner be-
fore some officer authorized by law to take the 
acknowledgment of conveyances of real estate. 
the City's enactment of the Ordinance \i 
this case. The City refers us only tc 
§ 57-5-3 l 9 and to Title 10, Chapter 9 of the 
Utah Code Ann. The majority opinior 
finds authority for the City's action ir 
§ 10-8-84 and various sections in Title 10 
Chapter 9, under the theory that the Cit} 
was acting under those powers necessaril} 
implied to it to carry out those powen 
expressly granted. Section 57-5-3 govern* 
the nature of maps and plats a subdivide] 
must file and have approved. Title 10 
Chapter 9, is a Legislative grant of powei 
to cities and towns for the purpose of enact-
ing zoning regulations to promote the 
"health, safety, morals and general welfare 
of the community." Chapter 10 also in-
eludes the Municipal Planning Enabling 
Act, §§ 10-9-19 through 10-9-30, whici 
empowers any city to adopt a master plar 
for the physical development of the munici-
pality and to promulgate regulations to as-
sure that subdivisions conform to the mas-
ter plan. The City has adopted a mastei 
plan as contemplated by the Act. 
Section 10-8-84 is a broad grant of the 
State's police "powers to cities and town* 
and is frequently referred to as the "gener 
al welfare clause."21 It is derived froir 
Utah's earliest laws and states: 
They [the cities and towns] may pas* 
all ordinances and rules, and make al 
regulations, not repugnant to law, neces 
sary for carrying into effect or discharg 
ing all powers and duties conferred b} 
this chapter, and such as are necessary 
and certified by the surveyor making such plat 
if the land is situated in any city or mcorporat 
ed town such plat or map shall be approved by 
its governing body, or by some city or towi 
officer for that purpose designated by resoiu 
tion or ordinance of such governing body; 
See also § 57-5-4, which states: 
Such maps and plats, when made, acknowl 
edged, filed and recorded, shall operate as z 
dedication of all such streets, alleys and othei 
public places, and shall vest the fee of suet 
parcels of land as are therein expressed, namee 
or intended for public uses in such county, citj 
or town for the public for the uses thereir 
named or intended. 
20. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, supra, note 8; Lari 
v. Whitehead, supra, note 9. 
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and proper to provide for the safety and 
preserve the health, and promote the 
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort and convenience of 
the city and the inhabitants thereof, and 
for the protection of property therein; 
Emphasis added.] 
This section is not, however, authority for 
the Ordinance under attack here. Cases 
decided under this statute are emphatic and 
explicit in limiting its scope. In Nasfell v. 
Ogden City,n the city's power to enact an 
ordinance declaring that the presence of a 
vehicle parked in violation upon any public 
street was prima facie evidence that the 
registered owner committed the violation, 
was successfully challenged. Although 
Chief Justice Crockett reasoned there as 
here, that what is now Section 10-8-84 
implied to the city the power to enact the 
ordinance, the Court held that the city had 
been granted no express authority to pass 
the ordinance, and that the city had no 
implied power to pass the ordinance based 
upon this general welfare statute or stat-
utes granting cities the right to regulate 
the use of streets, traffic and sidewalks. 
The Court has also characterized this 
statute as "merely in aid of the express 
powers elsewhere granted"22 in invalidat-
ing a city ordinance prohibiting keeping a 
pool table or playing pool. And in Lark v. 
Whitehead;a Chief Justice Crockett again 
dissenting, the Court held that while the 
cities had been expressly granted Legisla-
tive authority to enact an ordinance punish-
ing persons for indecent or disorderly con-
duct in § 10-8-50, Salt Lake City's ordi-
nance exceeded that statutory grant, and 
that even under § 10-8-84, the statute re-
lied upon in the majority opinion here, the 
city had no implied power to enact its ordi-
nance. , 
The general provisions of Sec. 10-8-84 
do not confer authority upon a municipal 
21. Supra, note 7. 
22. American Fork City v. Robinson, et al.t su-
pra, note 10 at 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 250. Ac-
cord, Bonn v. Salt Lake City, supra note 8. 
WEST JORDAN Utah 225 
MMP.2d217 
body to abrogate the limitations specified 
in the express provisions of Sec 10-8-50, 
U.C.A.1953. In Salt Lake City v. Sutter 
this court cited the principle that where 
an express authority is given to pass ordi-
nances in a particular class of cases, fol-
lowed by a general authority to pass all 
necessary laws, the express authority is a 
limitation upon the general power so far 
as it relates to matters which belong to 
the class of those enumerated, but which 
are not, in terms, included. A general 
power granted to the corporation to pass 
all ordinances necessary for the welfare 
of the corporation, is qualified and re-
stricted by those other clauses and provi-
sions of the charter or the general law 
which specify particular purposes for 
which ordinances may be passed. Other-
wise, the general clause would confer au-
thority to abrogate the limitations im-
plied from the express provisions.24 
In Layton City v. Speth,35 this Court set 
aside a conviction under a city ordinance 
which exceeded the statutory grant of au-
thority from the Legislature. In Layton 
City, the city had enacted an ordinance 
making it illegal for a vehicle owner to 
knowingly and intentionally permit persons 
who possess, use, or distribute controlled 
substances to occupy his vehicle. The State 
statute in effect at the time the ordinance 
was enacted granted to cities the power to 
prohibit distribution of intoxicating liquors, 
narcotics or controlled substances to persons 
under the age of twenty-one. This Court 
held over the dissents of Chief Justice 
Crockett and Justice Hall, that the ordi-
nance was not necessary for carrying into 
effect the purposes of the statute, was be-
yond the scope of Legislative authority 
granted to the city, and was therefore in-
valid. 
The remaining statutes cited by the City 
and the majority opinion as implied authori-
24. Id. at 28 Utah 2d 346, 502 P.2d 559. Accord, 
Allgood v. Larson, Utah, 545 P.2d 530 (1976). 
25. Supra, note 11 J 
23. Supra, note 9. 
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ty for the City to enact the Ordinance are 
zoning statutes found in Title 10, Chapter &, 
and §§ 57-5-3 and 57-5-4, the pertinent 
parts of which are cited in footnote 19 of 
this opinion. Clearly, these statutes do not 
grant the City express authority to enact 
the Ordinance nor do I find in these stat-
utes implied authority to enact the Ordi-
nance to carry out powers expressly grant-
ed under the zoning statutes. A general-
ized difference between zoning statutes and 
subdivision controls is that zoning normally 
prohibits certain uses of property, while the 
title remains in the private owner, and sub-
division controls normally make positive ex-
actions, such as conveyance of the title to 
the city, from the private owner. 
. . (7]t must be kept in mind 
that zoning regulations, generally, only 
limit the use of the property, whereas 
subdivision legislation often exacts a pen-
alty for approval of a desired use.2* 
Traditionally, zoning and subdivision 
have been founded on separate legislation 
and administered separately. Subdivision 
regulation and zoning are frequently in-
terrelated in purpose and technique; . 
[Nonetheless, fundamental differences 
do exist between the two areas. While 
zoning involves no more than negative 
prohibitions on certain uses of the own-
er's property, subdivision regulation often 
makes positive exactions of the owner. 
It may require him to construct streets or 
sewers, to convey a portion of his land to 
the municipality for public use, or to pay 
the equivalent of such construction or 
dedication in cash. It is submitted that 
this difference necessitates a more specif-
ic test of constitutionality, i. e., the legis-
lation should not only be substantially 
related to the public health, safety, mor-
als, or general welfare, but, insofar. as 
dedications, activities and expenditures 
are positively required of the subdivides 
these requirements should be reasonably 
26. Noland v. SL Louis County, Mo., 478 S.W.2d 
363, 366 (1972). 
27. Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Sub-
division, 14 Syracuse L.Rev. 417. 407 (Spring 
1963). 
related to the subdivision in question and 
should concern types of improvement for 
which municipalities have generally been 
conceded the power to levy special taxes 
or assessments.27 [Emphasis added.] 
Here, the City is not attempting to rezone 
the Subdividers' property from residential 
use to municipal use for schools and parks 
or to otherwise limit or prohibit its use. In 
this case, the City is requiring the Subdivid-
ers to convey land to it, or to pay it an 
amount of money equal to the value of the 
land, without remuneration. In no sense is 
this a conventional zoning case. 
Further, §§ 57-5-3 and 57-5-4 cannot 
stand as authority for the Ordinance. The 
statutes automatically vest fee title in the 
municipal agency upon acknowledgment 
and recordation of the plat. They do not 
delegate to the cities and towns the power 
to enact ordinances exacting property or in 
lieu fees, without compensation, from pri-
vate property owners as a condition to sub-
division approval. Nor can such exaction 
be read as necessarily or even fairly implied 
from those sections. 
In his review of State statutory autho-
rizations for subdivision control, Yokley re-
views §§ 57-5-1 to 57-5-8 of our Code and 
states: 
A review of these provisions indicates 
an absence of any standards governing 
approval of plats except the usual di-
rections for delineation of lots and 
streets, that is, there seems to be no 
authority conferred for the promulgation 
of regulations by the governing body 
which would require the meeting of cer-
tain conditions as a prerequisite to plat 
approval. The statute itself contains no 
provisions for meeting conditions before 
plat approval.28 
Anderson, in The American Law of Zon-
ing, distinguishes between requiring a sub-
division developer to plan for streets and 
28. Yokley, The Law of Subdivisions, § 116 
(1963). (Although this text is updated with a 
1979 pocket part, Yokley had noted no new 
developments or changes to his stated position 
on Utah law in the 1963 text.) 
CALL v. CITY OF 
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sewers, which he states can be required 
with or without subdivision controls, and 
which may be required in this State under 
§§ 57-5-3 and 57-5—4, and exacting proper* 
ty for other municipal purposes, which he 
repeatedly states must be done pursuant to 
strictly construed enabling legislation.29 
Finally, the Municipal Planning Enabling 
Act,* and specifically § 10-9-25, quoted by 
the majority opinion, cannot stand as suffi-
cient authority for the City to take the 
Subdivided property under its Ordinance. 
That Section states: "In exercising the 
powers granted to it by the act [the Munici-
pal Planning Enabling Act], the planning 
commission shall prepare regulations gov-
erning the subdivision of land within the 
municipality/' [Emphasis added.] No-
where does the act authorize the planning 
commission or any municipality of this 
State to take any portion of a subdivided 
property. The act enables municipal bodies 
to adopt a master plan (which the City has 
adopted), establish an official street map 
and to zone in conformance with those 
plans. It gives cities and towns the power 
to prohibit the issuance of a building permit 
or approval of a subdivision which does not 
conform to the master plan, and it makes it 
a misdemeanor to sell subdivision lots with-
out planning commission approval. Again, 
in this case, the City is not attempting 
either to rezone the Subdividers' property 
or to refuse to approve their subdivision 
until it conforms to the master plan; the 
City, here, is appropriating the Subdividers' 
property. 
The Legislature has had two opportuni-
ties to expressly expand the powers availa-
ble to municipalities in controlling problems 
associated with rapid subdivision develop-
ment, but it has not, as yet, prescribed that 
necessary expended power. In 1973, a bill 
was introduced'in the Utah Senate which 
would have delegated to the cities the pow-
er to require fees or dedication of land or 
both as a condition for approval of a subdi-
vision plat. In 1975, a bill amending 
29. 4 Anderson, The American Law of Zoning, 
§ 23.39, p. 141 (1977); see generally §§ 23.05, 
23.08, 23.26. and 23.39. 
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§ 10-9-25 was introduced in the Utah Sen-
ate which would have allowed cities and 
counties to prescribe qualifications upon 
subdividers, such as providing for storm 
drainage systems, parks and recreational 
facilities in order to gain approval of their 
subdivision plats. Neither bill gained the 
approval of both Houses of the Legislature. 
I have reviewed those statutes character-
ized by the City and the majority opinion as 
enabling the City's actions here, and I re-
main unpersuaded that any or all of them 
are sufficient to expressly grant or neces-
sarily imply to the City that power which it 
seeks to exercise by Ordinance No. 33. As 
noted ante, the normal presumptions in fa-
vor of th$ validity of statutes do not gener-
ally apply to ordinances, and this especially 
when the questioned ordinance seeks to ap-
propriate to the government some protected 
private right. 
There is some difference of view with 
respect to a presumption of power to 
enact an ordinance and also with respect 
to burden of proof on that issue. Gener-
ally, there is no such presumption of va-
lidity of an ordinance as against the ob-
jection that no pqwer existed under char-
ter or statute to ^nact it. In other words, 
there is no presumption in favor of the 
validity of an ordinance where it is ques-
tioned on the ground of want of power to 
enact it; on the contrary, power to pass it 
must appear to have existed when it was 
adopted, if the ordinance is to be sus-
tained. Accordingly, one claiming under 
an ordinance must be able to point to 
existing power to enact it, either granted 
in express terms or in terms by which the 
power is fairly and necessarily implied. 
Also, proof of authority to enact an ordi-
nance has been ruled to be necessary 
where objection is made to it 
on the ground that it interferes with 
common rights. Indeed, the view has 
been taken that with respect to the exer-
cise of every power by a municipal corpo-
ration, any reasonable doubt that arises 
as to the existence of the power is to be 
30. Sections 10-9-19 to 30. 
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resolved against the corporation, and the 
power is to be denied. Consistently, a 
strict construction against ordinances re-
stricting personal liberty, property, im-
munity or privilege is followed in many 
cases. . Certainly, where it is 
clear that an ordinance exceeds the legis-
lative powers of a city, it will not be 
presumed to be valid.31 
Only after ordinances are satisfactorily 
determined to have been enacted pursuant 
to Legislative grants of authority may they 
carry the presumption of validity. In Mar-
shall v. Salt Lake City,*2 Utah's zoning stat-
utes were declared constitutional and the 
City's ordinances, enacted pursuant to those 
express grants of authority, were upheld. 
At that point, the presumption of validity 
attaches to the ordinance under attack and 
it will not be declared invalid unless it is 
arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, 
or unless it clearly offends some provision 
of the Constitution or a statute.38 
It is also only after a subdivision ordi-
nance has been determined valid that it is 
to be tested as to its reasonableness in 
application to the particular fact situation. 
In Jenad v. Village of Scarsdale*4 cited in 
the majority opinion, villages in the State 
of New York had been delegated sufficient 
grants of power to require exactions from 
subdividers, so the question became one of 
the reasonableness of the application of the 
ordinance to the facts of that case, unlike 
our problem here. Applying the presump-
tion test to the facts of this case, the Ordi-
nance should fail for want of authority to 
enact i t 
Several states have enacted statutes au-
thorizing mandatory dedication of land or 
in lieu fees as a prerequisite to plat approv-
al. These enactments, however, have taken 
place with a keen eye to protecting the 
rights of private property owners. In Asso-
31. 6 McQuillin, supra, note 17, § 22.31. 
32. 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704 (1943). 
33. Id.; see also Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North 
Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 431 P.2d 559 
(1967). 
dated Home Builders v. City of Walnut 
Creek,2* a case relied upon by the City and 
the majority opinion, a dedication ordinance 
similar to the ordinance here survived at-
tack. But Associated Home Builders does 
not stand for the proposition espoused by 
the majority opinion, because that case con-
strued an ordinance which had been enacted 
pursuant to an express State enabling stat-
ute and a newly adopted amendment to the 
California Constitution. And in 1974, Cali-
fornia passed statutes3* requiring public 
agencies benefiting from the subdivision 
dedication to remunerate the developer-ded-
icator for his property. 
The Subdividers also challenge the Ordi-
. nance as an unreasonable exercise of the 
police power because the City has deposited 
the in lieu fees into its general account, 
presumably to be used for general City 
purposes, and because they claim, the City 
has not shown that the exaction from them 
is reasonably related to the demands placed 
on the City by their subdivisions, and that 
therefore the exaction benefits others at 
their subdivision's expense. The affidavit 
of one of the Subdividers (made a part of 
the record) states, and the City does not 
dispute, that the Subdividers' in lieu fees 
have been used to purchase land for a 
water-detention basin to receive run-off 
from subdivisions other than the one devel-
oped by the Subdividers herein. 
A reading of the Ordinance discloses that 
the land shall be dedicated or the in lieu 
fees paid "to the public use for the benefit 
and use of the citizens of the City of West 
Jordan" and "shall be used by the City for 
flood control and/or parks and recreational 
facilities." I 
As support for their argument, the Subdi-
viders cite Weber Basin Home Builders 
Ass'n v. Roy City*1 In that case, the Court 
34. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 [s|.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 
673 (1966). 
35. 4 Cal.3d 633, 94 CaLRptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 
(1971). 
36. Cal.Govnt.Code § 6(^477-80 (West). 
37. 26 Utah 2d 215. 487 P.2d 866 (1971). 
STATE v. LAMM 
Cite as, Utah. 606 P.2d 229 
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struck as ultra vires and discriminatory a 
city ordinance raising building permit fees 
from $12 to $112. The money was received 
and paid into the city's general fund, as also 
occurred in this case, not for the purpose of 
meeting increased costs of regulating build-
ing construction, but for the purpose of 
improving the city's water and sewer sys-
tems necessitated by the construction of 
new homes and for other general purposes. 
The Court observed that equal protection 
and due process principles are violated by 
an ordinance which undertakes to impose a 
greater burden of general government cost 
on one class of residents than upon others 
without reasonable basis for classification 
and held that an ordinance which imposed a 
greater burden on those who built within 
the city after the ordinance than before its 
enactment was constitutionally unaccepta-
ble. Chief Justice Crockett, writing for the 
Court, correctly stated: 
The critical question here in whether 
the ordinance in its practical operation 
results in an unjust discrimination by im-
posing a greater burden of the cost of 
city government on one class of persons 
as compared to another, without any 
proper basis for such differentiation and 
classification. It is not to be doubted 
that each new residence has its effect in 
increasing the cost of city government; 
nor that due to the steadily increasing 
costs of everything, including those in-
volved in rendering such services, the city 
would have authority to raise the fees 
charged for such services from time to 
time. Nevertheless, in that connection, 
the new residents are entitled to be treat-
ed equally and on the same basis as the 
old residents.38 [Emphasis added.] 
I am not unsympathetic to the needs of 
the cities in our State faced with dramatic 
expansion. I am constrained, however, to 
review their ordinances with sensitivity to 
both the constitutionally protected rights of 
property owners and the limiting nature of 
the statutory grants of power to those 
cities. And that sensitivity compels a view 
on my part that the Ordinance is invalid 
and void becausi of the specific reasons 
noted in this opinion. 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the dipsenting opinion of WIL-
KINS, J. 
:YHUMBER SYSTEM; YSTEMJ> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Albert Banard LAMM and Roy Lee 
Lamm, Defendants and Appellant 
No. 15888. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jak 16, 1980. 
Defendants were convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal 
Taylor, J., of theft by receiving, and they 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., 
held that evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish each element of offense charged, which 
was based upon alleged concealing or aiding 
in concealment of stolen property. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
1. Criminal Law «=» 1159.2(7, 9), 1159.4(2) 
It is exclusive function of jury to weigh 
evidence and to determine credibility of 
witnesses, and it is not within prerogative 
of Supreme Court to substitute its judg-
ment for that of fact finder; Supreme 
Court should only interfere when evidence 
is so lacking and insubstantial that reasona-
ble men could not possibly have reached 
verdict beyond reasonable doubt. 
38. Id. at 26 Utah 2d 218, 487 P 2d 868. 
CALL v. CITY OF WEST JORDAN 
Cite as, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257 
the public interest5 To accomplish this the required subdividers 
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Commission is empowered by the Legisla-
ture to employ necessary personnel, includ-
ing "experts" and "attorneys".6 By com-
parison, there is no statute which even es-
tablishes, much less defines, the nature or 
duties of the Division. The Division's exist-
ence is noted in the statutes7 but nowhere 
is the Division granted the right to litigate 
in its own name or otherwise, or, signifi-
cantly, to appeal Orders of the Commission. 
I believe that, absent express statutory 
authority granted by the Legislature, the 
Division of Public Utilities has no standing 
to appeal Orders of the Public Service Com-
mission. Indeed, the implication of Section 
13-1-1.3 is that the Division on behalf of 
the executive director of the Department of 
Business Regulation, is charged to execute 
"any rules, regulations or orders of the pub-
lic service commission of Utah issued pursu-
ant to its quasi-judicial or rule-making pow-
er". This Court should not allow the Divi-
sion, and particularly in the absence of a 
definitive grant of authority by the Legisla-
ture, to assume the tension-filled role to-
ward the Commission of both investigator-
enforcer and adversary. 
^0 t
 K£Y N UM8£8 SYSTf M"S 
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John CALL and Clark Jenkins, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 15908 (Rehearing). 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 27, 1980. 
Subdividers brought action to challenge 
validity of ordinance adopted by city which 
5. See, e. g.. United States Smelting, Refining 
and Milling Co. v Utah Power & Light Co., 58 
Utah 168, 197 P. 902 (1921); Utah Light & 
Traction Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101 
Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 (1941). 
to dedicate 7% of pro-
posed subdivision land to city or to pay 
equivalent of that value in cash to be used 
for flood control and/or park and recreation 
facilities. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, David K. Winder, J., upheld 
ordinance, and subdividers appealed. The 
Supreme Court, 606 P.2d 217, affirmed and 
remanded. On rehearing, the Supreme 
Court, Wilkins, J., held that ordinance was 
not unconstitutional on its face, but could 
not be applied without subdividers being 
given the opportunity to present evidence 
to show that dedication required of them 
had no reasonable relationship to needs, if 
any, for flood control or parks and recrea-
tion facilities created by their subdivision. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Municipal Corporations o=> 122(2) 
Once it is determined that municipal 
ordinance is within the scope of powers 
granted by the legislature, the ordinance is 
entitled to the presuhnption of constitution-
al validity accorded other legislation. 
2. Zoning and Planning o»61, 134 
Ordinance which required subdividers 
to dedicate 7^ of proposed subdivision land, 
or pay equivalent of that value in cash, to 
be used for flood control and/or park mu\ 
recreation facilities was not unconstitution-
al on its face, but could not be applied 
without subdividers being given the oppor-
tunity to present evidence to show that 
dedication required of them had no reasona-
ble relationship to needs, if any, for flood 
control or parks and recreation facilities 
created by their subdivision. 
3. Zoning and Planning c=>234 
If subdivision generates need for flood 
control or parks and recreation facilities 
and municipality exacts fee in lieu of dedi-
6. Section 54 1-6. 
7. See footnote 2, sup^a. 
ui** i n v i n t RaruKlftK, Zd ^hKlES 
cation of land for .such purpose^ fees so 
collected must be used in such a way as to 
benefit demonstrably the subdivision in 
question, though the benefit need not be 
solely to the particular subdivision 
Rolnsrt J. DeBry and Valden P Living-
ston, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and ao-
pc Hants. 
Lynn W. Mitton, Sandy, for defendant 
and respondent. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
This matter is again before us following 
our granting of plaintiffs' petition for 
rehearing. The original majority opinion 
addressed primarily the issue of whether 
there was statutory authority for the City 
of West Jordan to pass an ordinance requir-
ing a subdivider to dedicate land or pay a 
fee in lieu of dedication as a prerequisite to 
approval of the subdivision plat.1 This is-
sue was decided by the majority in the 
affirmative.2 On rehearing this Court lim-
ited the scope of review to the issue of 
whether the ordinance in question is consti-
tutional, and therefore we address only this 
matter now. 
f 11 Once it is determined that a munici-
pal ordinance is within the scope of powers 
1. The ordinance in question in pertinent part 
r
^ads as follows 
Section 9 C 8(a) In addition to all the 
)ther requirements pr^ s< nbed under this or-
dinance the subdivider shall be required to 
dedicate the seven per cent (1%) of the land 
area of the proposed subdivision to the public 
ust- for the benefit and use or the < itizens of 
the Citv of West lordjn or in the 
alternative at the option of the governing 
bodv of the Citv, th» Citv mav accept the 
equi\alent valu<> of »rV land in fash it it 
de^ms advisable 
2. f J)1 \ Cit\ nt VVVsf Jordan, Utah hOf, P 2d 
2i7/r*7 f)) In ( ill I the minor of (his opinion 
hi« d a dissenting opinion in whi« h Justice 
M iijL'han ron* urred and A huh concluded that 
tl M y is no statut »r e thontv for the <»rdi-
r, MI. f in question 
?». ' resmeir-Ho//«idj\ Homeowners \SS<KU-
' n hu \ Enuh f lorjl ( nmoan\ I tab 545 
granted by the legislature—and the prior 
opinion of this Court indicated that the 
ordinance in question was—the ordinance is 
entitled to the presumption of constitution-
al validity accorded other legislation.3 In 
Lhi* case, the District Court ruled that the 
ordinance was constitutional and therefore 
granted West Jordan's motion to dismiss. 
[2, 3] While we agree that the ordinance 
is not unconstitutional on its face,4 plain-
tiffs raise questions as to its constitutionali-
ty *is applied to them which make disposi-
tion of this issue as a matter of law inap-
propriate. We stated in our prior opinion in 
this case that "the dedication should have 
some reasonable relationship to the need 
created by the subdivision."5 This same 
requirement has been articulated in the de-
cisions of other jurisdictions addressing this 
issue. In Jordan v. Village of Mcnomonee 
Fa//s,6 the Court held: 
We conclude that a required dedication 
of land for park or recreation-
al sites as a condition for approval of the 
subdivision plat should be upheld as a 
valid exercise of police power if the evi-
dence reasonably establishes that the mu-
nicipality will be required to provide 
rnore land for parks and play-
grounds as a result of approval of the 
subdivision. 
p2d 1150 M976), 1 R Anderson, American 
Law of Zoning 2d 11977). * 3 23 
4. While brevitv and succinctness in the draft-
ing of legislation—as in judicial opinions—mav 
be des-rable and certainlv is appreciated, the 
ordinance in question w hen compared with 
similar provisions from other jurisdictions evi-
dences a paucity ot stated purpose and stan-
dards of application that borders on rendering 
the ordinance unconstitutionally vague See, e 
X the ordinances quoted in Jordan \ Village of 
Mennmonee Falls 28 Wis 2d 608. 137 N W 2d 
±A1 (1965). Associated Home Builders \ Cit\ 
of Vi i\nvt tireek. K a l 3d 633. 4S4 ? 26 606. 94 
( al Rptr 630 (1971) Home Builder* Assocux 
aon ot Greater Kansas ('itv v ( it\ nt Kansas 
Cir\ 575 S W 2d 832 < Mo 1977) 
5. W«. P2d at 220 
6. 2^ Wis 2d 608 618 137 N W 2d 442 448 
STATE, ETC. v. UTAH M 
Cite as, Utah, 
Likewise in Home Builders Association of 
Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas 
City/ the Missouri Supreme Court held: 
if the burden cast upon the 
subdivider is reasonably attributable to 
his activity, then the requirement [of ded-
ication or fees in lieu thereof] is permissi-
ble; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to 
a confiscation of private property in con-
travention of the constitutional prohibi-
tions rather than reasonable regulation 
under the police power. Insofar as the 
establishment of a subdivision within a 
city increases the recreational needs of 
the city, then to that extent the cost of 
meeting that increase indeed may reason-
ably be required of the subdivider. (Em-
phasis in original.) 
In this case the rule adopted by this 
Court in Call /, quoted ante, cannot be 
applied without plaintiffs being given the 
opportunity to present evidence to show 
that the dedication required of them had no 
reasonable relationship to the needs for 
flood control or parks and recreation facili-
ties created by their subdivision, if any. 
Implicit in this rule is the requirement that 
if the subdivision generates such needs and 
West Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of dedi-
cation, it is only fair that the fee so collect-
ed be used in such a way as to benefit 
demonstrably the subdivision in question. 
This is not to say that the benefit must be 
solely to the particular subdivision, but only 
that there be some demonstrable benefit to 
it. 
Reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
No costs awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
7. 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977). 
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STATE of Utah, By and Through the DE-
PARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AF-
FAIRS, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v, 
UTAH MERIT SYSTEM COUNCIL and 
William A. Callahan, Defendants 
and Appellant 
No. 16501. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 3, 1980. 
State sought review of a decision of the 
Merit System Council ordering the reem-
ployment of an employee of th<* Depart-
ment of Community Affairs. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Counu, G. Hal 
Taylor, J., reversed, and remanded to the 
Council to hold a new hearing. Employee 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that the exclusion of the director of 
the Department of Community Affairs 
from a portion of the administrative hear-
ing because she was a witness in the pro-
ceeding was reversible error and the attend-
ance by a deputy director, who directed 
another arm of the operation and lacked 
full knowledge of the case, was not suffi-
cient to provide the Department with ap-
propriate representation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Officers and Public Employees c=>72(l) 
Both parties to proceeding before Merit 
System Council were entitled to have testi-
mony taken under oath or affirmation. 
2. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72(2) 
Failure to place witnesses before Merit 
System Council under oath was not revers-
ibly erroneous where no objection was 
raised until State sought review of Council 
order in district court. 
3. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72(2) 
Omissions from record of proceeding 
before Merit System Council were not re-
Utah Rep. 608 615 P.2d—16 
John CALL and Clark Jenkins, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 19186. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 23, 1986. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1986. 
Subdividers brought action to chal-
lenge validity of ordinance adopted by city 
which required subdividers to dedicate 7% 
of proposed subdivision land to city or to 
pay equivalent of that value in cash to be 
used for flood control and/or park and 
recreation facilities. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David K. Winder, 
J., upheld ordinance and subdividers ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, 606 P.2d 217, 
affirmed and remanded. On rehearing, the 
Supreme Court, 614 P.2d 1257, upheld fa-
cial constitutionally of ordinance and re-
manded with instructions. On remand, the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J., entered judgment in favor 
of city and subdividers appealed. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court, Howe, J., held 
that city planning and zoning commission 
failed to comply with statutory require-
ments of public hearing prior to adoption of 
impact fee ordinance where advance notice 
to public was not provided, ordinance being 
considered had not yet been drafted, and 
public did not have opportunity to voice 
their views. 
Remanded with instructions. 
Stewart, J., dissented. 
1. Appeal and Error e=>1201(3) 
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in allowing developers to amend com-
plaint after remand, where issues in 
amended complaint were not specifically 
foreclosed by appellate court during prior 
review. 
2. Zoning and Planning <3=>134, 135 
City planning and zoning commission 
failed to comply with statutory require-
ments of public hearing prior to adoption of 
impact fee ordinance where advance notice 
of purpose of meeting was not provided to 
public, ordinance in issue had not yet been 
drafted, and public did not have opportuni-
ty to express their views; it was not suffi-
cient that ordinance was adopted at regu-
larly scheduled city council meeting. U.C. 
A.1953, 10-9-1 to 10-9-30. 
3. Parties <s=»9, 11 
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying class action status to devel-
opers challenging impact fee ordinance, 
where proposed class members were identi-
fiable, where each claim would require indi-
vidual consideration by court regardless of 
class status, and where there was no possi-
bility that inconsistent judgments would be 
issued if individual claims were brought. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 23. 
Robert J. Debry, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan City 
Atty., West Jordan, for defendant and re-
spondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiffs, John Call and Clark Jenkins, 
appeal from the trial court's dismissal of 
their complaint and the entry of judgment 
in favor of defendant, City of West Jordan. 
In 1974, West Jordan formulated a plan 
to expand its flood control and public park 
systems to meet the increasing needs of 
the growing city. As part of its plan, West 
Jordan decided to impose an impact fee as
 4 
a condition to granting plat approval to 
subdivision developers. The fee was seven 
percent of the land in the subdivision or, at 
the option of the city, the equivalent value 
in cash. West Jordan, Utah, Ordinance 33, 
§ 9-0-8(2) (1975). Plaintiffs paid the fees 
under protest and later brought this action 
attacking the ordinance. 
CALL v. CITY OF WEST JORDAI 
Cite u 727 P^d 180 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 181 
We have issued two previous opinions in 
this case. In our first opinion, Call v. City 
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) 
(Call / ) , we held that U.C.A., 1953, 
§§ 10-9-1 to -30 empowered West Jordan 
to exact an impact fee to provide for flood 
control and parks as a condition to grant-
ing plat approval. On rehearing, in Call v. 
City of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257 
(1980) (Call II), we upheld the facial consti-
tutionality of the ordinance, but we re-
manded to give plaintiffs an "opportunity 
to present evidence to show that the dedica-
tion required of them had no reasonable 
relationship to the needs for flood control 
or parks and recreation facilities created by 
their subdivision, if any." Id. at 1259. 
[1] On remand, the trial court allowed 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to in-
clude a claim that the ordinance was invalid 
because West Jordan had not followed stat-
utory requirements in enacting it Al-
though West Jordan does not cross-appeal 
the allowance of the amendment, it urges 
this Court to limit the case to the constitu-
tional "reasonableness" issue. However, 
the pleadings may be amended after re-
mand within the sound discretion of the 
trial court so long as they do not cover 
issues specifically foreclosed by the appel-
late court Street v. Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, 113 Utah 60, 
191 P.2d 153 (1948), Utah R.Civ.P. 15; see 
White v. Lobdell, 196 Mont 156, 638 P.2d 
1057 (1982); Diversified Capitol Corp. v. 
City of North Las Vegas, 95 Nev. 15, 590 
P.2d 146 (1979). The trial court allowed 
West Jordan to argue why the pleadings 
should not be amended; but after consider-
ation, allowed the amendment. Neither 
Call I nor Call II specifically addressed 
this issue, and we find no abuse of discre-
tion in the trial court's allowing the amend-
ment Therefore, the issue of whether 
West Jordan had followed statutory re-
quirements in enacting the ordinance was 
properly before the trial court 
Because of problems encountered by the 
plaintiffs in its discovery of information in 
the possession of West Jordan and because 
of our decision in Banberry Development 
Corp. v. South Jotdan City, 631 P.2d 899 
(Utah 1981), the trii.1 court issued a pretrial 
order which placed on West Jordan the 
burden of producing evidence on several 
issues. These issues may be condensed 
into two main issues: (1) the reasonable-
ness of the impact fee as applied to plain-
tiffs, and (2) whether the ordinance had 
been adopted according to statutory re-
quirements. 
It is necessary in this opinion to treat 
only the second issue. West Jordan was 
required at the threshold to present prima 
facie evidence that the city had followed 
the statutory requirements contained in 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 10*-9-l to -30 in enacting 
the ordinance. Within section 25, the legis-
lature has set forth specific procedures 
that a municipality must follow to exercise 
the powers granted to it 
In exercising the powers granted to it by 
the act, the planning commission shall 
prepare regulations governing the subdi-
vision of land within the municipality. A 
public hearing thereon shall be held by 
the legislative body, after which the leg-
islative body may adopt said regulations 
for the municipality. 
The trial judge held in his conclusions of 
law that the ordinance was validly promul-
gated and that "[i]t was not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the city 
failed to comply with the provisions of sec-
tion 10-9-25, Utah Code Annotated, in the 
promulgation of the ordinance." This con-
clusion was supported by the court's find-
ing of fact No. 22: 
Prior to the adoption of the Ordinance, 
the governing body of the City conducted 
a public hearing in which an overall mas-
ter plan for the development of the city 
was discussed. This hearing (held in Au-
gust 1974) was conducted in the West 
Jordan school auditorium so as to accom-
modate the large number of citizens in 
attendance. The specific concept of 
flood control and having an impact fee 
paid by new developers was discussed at 
that public hearing. The Ordinance was 
prepared by the West Jordan Planning 
and Zoning Commission, even though the 
City Attorney was responsible for the 
selection of the actual language used in 
the text of the Ordinance. The plaintiffs 
submitted no evidence to show that a 
public hearing was not held or that the 
Planning and Zoning Commission did not 
prepare the Ordinance. 
We need not rule on the accuracy of this 
finding to resolve the issues presented in 
this case. Nevertheless, we are free to 
substitute our judgment for that of the 
trial court on the issue of law as to wheth-
er these facts satisfy the requirements of 
section 10-9-25. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 
585 (Utah 1982), Automotive Manufactur-
ers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, 
Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). As men-
tioned above, the pretrial order placed upon 
West Jordan the burden of making a prima 
facie showing that it had satisfied the re-
quirements of section 10-9-25. We hold as 
a matter of law that it failed to carry this 
burden. 
Some months prior to the August 1974 
public hearing, the West Jordan Planning 
and Zoning Commission had discussed on 
numerous occasions the idea of requiring 
developers to dedicate a portion of their 
subdivision or to pay an equivalent value in 
cash for parks and flood control. In fact, 
on March 20, 1974, the Commission adopted 
a motion to have the city require five per-
cent from subdividers to use for parks. A 
month later, after the Commission had ex-
acted the five percent fee from at least one 
subdivides the city planner told the Com-
mission that the city had no legal basis to 
impose the fee. During this time, a special 
committee was preparing the West Jordan 
Master Plan. The master plan speaks only 
in general terms about the need for parks 
and recreational facilities. It also address-
es in vague terms who should pay for 
capital improvements to the city, hinting 
that incoming residents should pay more 
than existing residents because "equity in 
community improvements are [sic] seldom 
fairly shared through taxation." Nothing 
in the master plan proposes that developers 
either dedicate seven percent of their subdi-
visions or the cash equivalent as a condi-
tion to receiving approval for their plats. 
West Jordan asserts, however, that the 
"specific concept of flood control and hav-
ing an impact fee paid by new developers 
was discussed" at the public hearing on the 
master plan. The minutes of the public 
hearing were not introduced as an exhibit, 
nor are they included in the record. How-
ever, one of the witnesses for West Jordan 
testified as to what was in the minutes: 
[Mr. Moosman:] [T]he minutes reflect 
that Mrs. Schmidt asked [the city plan-
ner] concerning what was going on 
with the flood control problems. And 
perhaps I could read that It would be 
quicker. 
[The Court] . . . Go ahead and read the 
pertinent parts. What does Mrs. 
Schmidt say? 
A. [The witness:] She asked [the city 
planner] to tell what the County Flood 
Control had in mind for developers in 
the— 
Q. Yeah. Go ^ head. 
A. [The city planner] then explained 
that each developer must take care of 
his own flood water that originates on 
his property. They have suggested 
catch basins that can be used both for 
flood control and recreational use 
It is to be observed that an impact fee was 
not mentioned. In January 1975, four 
months after the master plan public hear-
ing, the city council enacted the ordinance 
which imposed the seven percent impact 
fee. No evidence of any other public hear-
ing remotely related to the ordinance ap-
pears in the record, 
[2] One's imagination must be 
stretched beyond rational limits to accept 
the master plan public hearing as satisfy-
ing the public hearing requirement of sec-
tion 10-9-25. The ordinance was not even 
drafted until months after the master plan 
public hearing. Section 10-9-25 is very 
clear in this respect The Commission 
must first prepare the regulations, one of 
which would provide for the impact fee. 
Then a public hearing thereon shall be held 
by the legislative body, after which the 
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legislative body may adopt said regulations 
for the municipality. In requiring a public 
hearing, our legislature contemplated that 
interested parties would have an opportuni-
ty to give their views, pro and con, regard-
ing a specific legislative proposal, and 
thereby aid the municipal government in 
making its land use decisions. See gener-
ally 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zon-
ing § 4.11 (2d ed. 1976); 8A E. McQuillin, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations 
§ 25.251 (rev. 3d ed., 1976). 
West Jordan also argues that because 
the ordinance was adopted at a regularly 
scheduled city council meeting which was 
open to the public, the public hearing re-
quirement was satisfied. Although the 
statute does not specifically address the 
required notice, we hold that because the 
statute calls for a public hearing our legis-
lature contemplated something more than a 
regular city council meeting held, so far as 
the record here discloses, without specific 
advance notice to the public that the pro-
posed ordinance would be considered. See 
1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 
§ 4.11 (2d ed. 1976). Notice, to be effec-
tive, must alert the public to the nature and 
scope of the ordinance that is finally 
adopted. Id. at 200. Failure to strictly 
follow the statutory requirements in enact-
ing the ordinance renders it invalid. Mel-
ville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 
(Utah 1975); Anderson at 199. This well 
established rule is followed by the great 
majority of jurisdictions. Annot, 96 A.L. 
R.2d 449 (1964); see Town of Beverly 
Shores Plan Commission v. Ennght, 463 
N.E.2d 246 (Ind.1984) (statute required mu-
nicipality to publish two notices in newspa-
per within ten days of hearing—ordinance 
invalidated where first notice appeared in 
newspaper eleven days before hearing); 
Kalakowski v. Clarendon, 139 Vt. 519, 431 
A.2d 478 (1981); Morland Development 
Co. v. Tulsa, 596 P,.2d 1255 (Okla.1979) 
(city ordinance establishing flood control 
districts invalidated because of failure to 
follow statutory requirements). We there-
fore hold that the West Jordan, Utah, Ordi-
nance 33, § 9-08(2) (1975), is invalid and 
void ab initio. 
One further matted must be addressed. 
Plaintiffs urge that we reverse the trial 
judge's findings denying class action status 
to this lawsuit We will reverse a trial 
court's decision on class action status only 
when it is shown that the trial court misap-
plied the law or abused its discretion. 
Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 
436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir.1970); 3B J. Moore 
& J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 23.97 (2d ed. 1985); 2 H. Newberg, New-
berg on Class Actions § 7.39 (2d ed. 1985). 
In the history of this lawsuit, plaintiffs 
requested class action certification on three 
different occasions from three different tri-
al judges. All three denied their requests. 
Plaintiffs do not assert that the trial court 
misapplied the law in denying class action 
status. Thus, we shall review the trial 
court's decision to determine whether it 
abused its discretion. 
[3] The trial court found that the "puta-
tive class is not so numerous that joinder of 
all parties is impracticable." Plaintiffs as-
sert that the size of the class alone man-
dates that joinder is impracticable. How-
ever, size of the class is not solely determi-
native of impracticability. We acknowl-
edge that there may be instances where 
sheer size alone would determine impracti-
cability. One of the salutary effects of 
Rule 23, Utah R.Civ.K, is that it allows 
access to the courts for numerous claim-
ants to request redress of claims that are 
too small to merit the expenses of litigation 
on an individual basis. 1 H. Newberg, 
Newberg on Class Actions § 3.03 n. 38, 
§ 3.06 at 145 (2d ed. 1985). In other in-
stances, the size and membership of the 
class may be unknown, which makes join-
der impracticable. Hdwever, we are here 
dealing with a class wJhose members have 
been identified. They are developers en-
gaged in business whose claims are not so 
insubstantial that joinder or individual suits 
would not merit the cost It is unlikely 
that denial of class action status would 
preclude them from piirsuing their reme-
dies. See 1 Newberg at 145. Judicial econ-
omy would be little Served because the 
amount of the claim o^  each class member 
would still need to be determined on a^ i 
individual basis, regardless of class actioh 
status. Because of our ruling on the mer-
its of the case, there is no possibility of 
inconsistent judgments and no issue of sub-
stantial public interest remains. Given the 
facts of this case, we cannot hold that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying 
class action status. 
We remand this case to the trial court to 
enter judgment consistent with this opin-
ion. Costs to plaintiffs. 
I 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
Gustav E. CLAUS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Marlise CLAUS, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 20021, 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 1, 1986. 
Divorce decree dividing marital proper-
ty was entered by the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., and 
husband appealed. The Supreme Court 
held that: (1) division of marital property 
was eminently fair, (2) making Internal 
Revenue Service obligation into husband's 
separate debt was not abuse of discretion; 
and (3) award of temporary alimony to wife 
was not abuse of discretion in view of her 
inability to earn income during parties' sep-
aration. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <3=>252.2, 253(4) 
Division of marital property was em 
nently fair in awarding approximate] 
equal equities despite court not finding va 
ues of parties' premarital assets and ii 
crease in those values after date of mai 
riage. 
2. Divorce «s=»252.4 
In dividing marital property, making 
Internal Revenue Service obligation sepa 
rate debt of husband was not abuse oi 
discretion in light of joint income tax re 
turns disclosing that wife's income was 
minimal at best 
3. Divorce <s=>215 
Award of one year of temporary alimo-
ny in amount of $350 per month was not 
abuse of discretion in view of wife's inabili-
ty to maintain real estate license or 
manage parties' rental properties during 
separation due to pendency of divorce. 
J. Richard Bell, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant 
George H. Searle, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
In this divorce action, plaintiff appeals 
from that portion of the decree dealing 
with the distribution of the parties' marital 
estate and the award of temporary alimony 
to defendant We affirm. 
j The parties were married four and one-
I half years before they separated. No chil-
dren were born of the marriage. Both had 
been married before and had brought sev-
eral pieces of real property into the mar-
riage. The trial court awarded plaintiff all 
the assets of his two corporations, real 
property owned by those corporations, and 
a rental unit acquired by the parties during 
the marriage. Defendant was awarded the 
home she lived in at the time of the divorce, 
real property the parties had acquired with 
proceeds from her real property holdings, 
and property acquired by the parties under 
uniform real estate contracts. Plaintiff 
was ordered to pay to defendant $350 a 
